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The motivations of external whistleblowers and their impact on 




This studys purpose was to inquire into the relative importance of morality, cost-benefit, and 
emotion as motivations for the decision to blow the whistle externally, and the effects of such 
factors as motivations, perceived negative consequences, and preference for reform on the 
intention to blow the whistle again. Based on a literature review, some hypotheses were 
formulated and, to test them, we used data collected from a survey of 127 external 
whistleblowers in South Korea. The results revealed that morality was the most important 
motivation, followed by emotion and then cost-benefit, which thus seemed to be the least 
important for the whistleblowers. Morality as a motivation and the perceived negative 
consequences of whistleblowing had a significant effect on the intention to blow the whistle 
again. This study helps advance the understanding of the motivations behind whistleblowing 
and the factors that influence the intention to blow the whistle again. 
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Most previous studies have explained external whistleblowing as resulting from normative 
judgment and/or morality (Hoffman & Schwartz, 2015; Bouville, 2008). The stereotypical 
public image of an external whistleblower has also been that of the moral hero with 
unflinching courage who reacted in the face of injustice or danger to the public. Other 
researchers (e.g., Miceli et al., 2012; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Keil et al., 2010; Heyes & 
Kapur, 2009; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005) have explained whistleblowing by means of a cost-
benefit model, arguing that the decision to blow the whistle is based on a rational or 
economic analysis. More recently, however, some scholars have maintained that emotion 
plays a key role in the decision to blow the whistle (e.g., Fredin, 2011; Gundlach, Martinko, 
& Douglas, 2008; Hollings, 2013). For example, Hollings (2013) stated that an intense 
emotion episode, particularly anger, is a prerequisite to motivate whistleblowers to disclose 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, Gobert and Punch (2003: 28) asserted that blowing the 
whistle is triggered by “a complex combination of motives,” even including a self-serving 
motive like malevolence. The relative importance of these motivations has not been 
sufficiently examined, especially in relation to actual whistleblowers as opposed to people 
reacting to hypothetical scenarios. Potential whistleblowers face difficult choices about 
whether or not to raise concerns so a general willingness to blow the whistle again may help 
individuals to make an informed decision that they do not regret later. Further, it gives an 
indication of how successful whistleblower protection laws are in achieving their goals to 
encourage employees to blow the whistle and organizations to create a culture that fosters the 
raising of concerns about suspected wrongdoing (Lewis, 2017). However, little has been 
known about the factors that affect the intention to blow the whistle again. Previous studies 
have considered whistleblowers as people who are highly committed to morality (Bouville, 
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2008; Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989) and reform-oriented (Near & Miceli, 1987) or idealists 
(Gobert & Punch, 2003) principled or committed to pursuing values (Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 
1989), presenting a vision of change and acting according to their values or principles. 
Jackson et al. (2010) found that some whistleblowers would never speak up again, feeling 
that whistleblowing is not worth the negative consequence of not being able to work again in 
their profession. Thus general motivations, the negative consequences, and preference for 
reform might be factors that determine the intent to blow the whistle again. 
The purpose of this study was to inquire into the relative importance of morality, cost-
benefit analysis and emotion as motivations for deciding to blow the whistle externally, and 
into how such factors as motivations, perceived negative consequences, and preference for 
reform affect the intention of actual whistleblowers to raise concerns again. The main 
research questions addressed were: (1) how important do external whistleblowers consider 
morality, cost-benefit analysis, and emotions to be as motivations in the decision to blow the 
whistle? Which is the most important motivation? (2) What factors significantly affect the 
intent to blow the whistle again?  
The descriptions or assumptions regarding whistleblowers' motivations are important but 
sometimes conflicting (see Hollings, 2013; Henik, 2008). Although laws protect 
whistleblowers who believe their allegations contribute to the interests of the public (Ashton, 
2015; Peeples, Stokes, & Wingfield, 2009; Lewis, 2015; Gobert & Punch, 2003), 
whistleblowers are sometimes embroiled in legal and emotional disputes with management 
after exposing wrongdoing (Fincher, 2009). This study contributes to understanding 
whistleblowing and those disputes by exploring the relative importance of the three 
motivations identified above in the decision-making process. Unlike most previous studies 
(e.g., Chen & Lai, 2014; Near et al., 2004) that investigated the intention of non-
whistleblowers, including those studies in South Korea (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Park et 
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al., 2008; Park, Rehg, & Lee, 2005), the intention of actual whistleblowers to raise concerns 
again may be more worth examining in order to better protect whistleblowers and encourage 




The major assumptions or views about the motivations of whistleblowers that have been 
adopted by previous studies (usually vignettes) include morality, cost-benefit calculations, 
and emotion. Many previous studies (Hoffman & Schwartz, 2015; Avakian & Roberts, 2012; 
Bouville, 2008; Grant, 2002) explained whistleblowing as stemming from high moral 
motives. Many other studies (e.g., Miceli et al., 2012) have identified cost-benefit analysis as 
the underlying motive in the whistleblowing decision-making process. However, Bouville 
(2008) suggested that morality and the idea of whistleblowing as a choice based on a cost-
benefit analysis are incompatible, because whistleblowers disclosed wrongdoing even though 
they knew that they might be retaliated against by their employer and colleagues. Some other 
researchers (e.g., Hollings, 2013; Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989) have asserted that emotion, 
particularly anger, is an immediate motivation for blowing the whistle. Gundlach, Martinko, 
and Douglas (2008: 46) reported that anger played a significant role in “translating cognitive 
assessments of wrongdoing into decisions to blow the whistle.” Hollings (2013: 511) also 
rejected the argument that the whistle is blown after the costs and benefits have been weighed 
and asserted that emotion was central in the decision-making process, with anger as “a 
prerequisite to motivate whistleblowers to reach a final decision.”  
Morality. Morality can be defined as a personal belief in moral values that enables one to 
perceive differences between right and wrong or true and false. Whistleblowing is basically 
not routine and repetitive, but an exceptional type of behavior, specifically grounded on a 
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moral obligation and judgments, conscience or social justice, personal integrity, professional 
responsibility and ethics, and courage (Watts & Buckley, 2017; Shawver, Clements, & 
Sennetti, 2015; O'Sullivan & Ngau, 2014; Alleyne, Hudaib, & Pike, 2013; Lindblom, 2007; 
Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Miceli et al., 2012; Vinten, 1992). Morality issues in 
whistleblowing have been studied in various aspects such as moral dilemma (Lindblom, 
2007), the dual process of moral intuition or deliberative reasoning in which moral 
whistleblowing takes place (Watts & Buckley, 2017), philosophical aspects of moral 
decisions (O'Sullivan & Ngau, 2014), impact of moral intensity and judgments on 
whistleblowing intentions (Shawver, Clements, & Sennetti, 2015), and accountability 
perspective (Williams & Adams, 2013). Most researchers have claimed that morality is the 
most important motivation for reporting wrongdoing (Miceli et al., 2009), adopting a 
normative perspective in explaining whistleblowing (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; 
Peeples, Stokes, & Wingfield, 2009; Davis, 1996). In their study to suggest a conceptual 
model for understanding external auditors’ whistle-blowing intentions, Alleyne, Hudaib, and 
Pike (2013: 11) stated that audit staff are required to have “a moral obligation to protect the 
public’s interest”. Hoffman and Schwartz (2015: 771) reexamined “the conditions under 
which “external whistleblowing by employees can be considered either morally permissible 
or obligatory” (as cited in De George, 2010), considering that morality is the most important 
motivator for the reporting of wrongdoing. Avakian and Roberts (2012: 71) further 
emphasized that morality serves as a trigger that “leads individuals to blow the whistle in 
organizations.” The decision to raise concerns about wrongdoing can be very stressful for 
workers who may perceive whistleblowing as a high risk activity. Hence, Miethe (1999) 
explained it as a tough choice that only a few people who have fortitude and a strong sense of 
social justice can make. Rost (2006) described whistleblowing as a courageous act to serve 
the public good which may incur a heavy cost that exceeds the gain.  
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Cost-benefit basis. For a cost-benefit basis (also presented as a rational decision/choice or 
a cool-headed perspective), whistleblowing is a behavior underpinned by a rational 
calculation of gains and losses. The cost-benefit perspective is based on the assumption that 
individuals will evaluate the consequences of their actions in terms of its costs and benefits 
and will decide to act if the expected benefits exceed the cost. Much whistleblowing literature 
(e.g., Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Miceli et al., 2012; Peeples, Stokes, & Wingfield, 2009; 
Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Miceli & Near, 1985) has adopted cost-benefit 
analysis as a motivational foundation for disclosing wrongdoing. Henik (2008: 111) 
maintained that “existing whistleblowing models rely on ‘cold’ economic calculations and 
cost-benefit analyses to explain the judgments and actions of potential whistleblowers.” 
Historically, research on ethical decision-making and crime deterrence has taken this view of 
costs and benefits (Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007). Werber and Balkin (2010: 319) 
assumed that employees decide to engage in misconduct “by considering the opportunities to 
be gained from misconduct (rewards/incentives) compared to the fear of being caught 
(performance assessment).” This perspective, however, does not explain why certain people 
blew the whistle even though they were aware that they could suffer damage far exceeding 
the benefits of reporting. 
Emotion. Some other researchers (e.g., Brown & Mitchell, 2010; Fredin, 2011; Vadera et 
al., 2009; Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Henik, 2008) stressed that emotion is a 
major factor influencing the decision to blow the whistle. Gundlach, Martinko, and Douglas 
(2008) considered emotional responses, such as anger and resentment, toward the wrongdoers 
to be a key factor. Henik (2008: 113) proposed that observed violations prompt negative 
emotions, such as anger, which in turn trigger the decision to choose the right action. In a 
study exploring the role of emotion in the whistleblowing process, Hollings (2013: 511) 
concluded that an emotional episode drove the decision to speak out. Gundlach, Martinko, 
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and Douglas (2008) found that anger about organizational wrongdoing fully mediated the 
relationship between judgments of responsibility about the wrongdoing and decisions to blow 
the whistle. 
Summary. Motivations are the principles or ideas underlying the decision to report 
wrongdoing. Based on the literature review above and dictionary definitions, we distilled the 
key descriptors of morality, cost/benefit, and emotion. For example, the indicators of morality 
came up from previous studies where the moral motivation of whistleblowing has been 
represented by the messengers of the truth (Bouville, 2008), a moral sense of right or wrong 
(Alleyne, Hudaib, & Pike, 2013), courage and self-sacrifice (Rost, 2006 & Grant, 2002), 
honors and recognition as heroes or saints (Bouville, 2008), and moral decision of right (good) 
or wrong (bad) (O'Sullivan & Ngau, 2014). Table 1 summarizes the key descriptors of three 
motivations for blowing the whistle. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
Much of the literature has described whistleblowers as people who decided to blow the 
whistle because they believed that their behavior was morally right, although they had known 
that they could face profoundly negative consequences i.e. the costs of blowing the whistle 
could far exceed the benefits. Our first hypothesis is based on the assumption that the whistle 
will more likely be blown because of a moral obligation than cost-benefit calculations or a 
burst of emotion: 
 
H1: Out of the motivations, morality will be the most important in deciding to blow the 
whistle. 
 
Intent to Blow the Whistle Again and Perceived Negative Consequences 
The intention to blow the whistle again can be defined as the psychological dispositions or 
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tendencies of workers to raise concerns again if they are in the same or a similar situation. 
This may be based on their having no regrets about what they did before and despite the fact 
they may have experienced serious negative consequences. This intention might indicate their 
confidence that their decision to blow the whistle was right or their historical evaluation of 
the entire system for protecting whistleblowers. An intention to report again based on their 
personal experiences can offer guidance to potential whistleblowers about whether or not to 
raise concerns. Holden (1996) and Jos, Tompkins, and Hays (1989) reported that about 80 
percent of whistleblowers would blow the whistle again if they faced similar circumstances. 
Soeken and Soeken (1987: 14) found in their survey of 233 whistleblowers that 54 percent 
said ‘extremely likely’ when asked if would be to blow the whistle again, and only 16 percent 
said ‘not at all.’  
The negative consequences whistleblowers suffered as a result of blowing the whistle 
would be a key factor to reduce the intent to re-blow the whistle. Some of the primary reasons 
that employees are reluctant to blow the whistle include “retaliation” (Near & Miceli, 1986) 
and the negative beliefs that “nothing could be done to rectify the situation” (Near et al., 2004: 
219). Previous studies (e.g., Jackson et al., 2010; Peeples, Stokes, & Wingfield, 2009) 
indicated that the negative consequences sharply reduced the intention to raise concerns again. 
However, those who blew the whistle based on morality would probably be likely to raise 
concerns again if they were placed in a similar situation. On the other hand, those who blew 
the whistle after relying on a cost-benefit analysis or emotion and suffered harmful 
consequences would not be likely to raise concerns again. This leads us to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: Morality will significantly contribute to increasing the intention to blow the whistle 
again. 
H2b: Cost-benefit calculations and emotion will not have a significant effect on the intent to 
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do so again. 
H2c: The perceived negative consequences that result from blowing the whistle will reduce 
the intention to do so again. 
 
Preference for Reform 
A preference for reform can be defined as a tendency to want to change the status quo, 
pursuing an ideal state or higher standard of success, compared to a predisposition to accept 
the current state of affairs and dislike change. The preference could be considered as another 
key factor to increase the intent to re-blow the whistle in that disclosures are mostly made to 
make changes in wrong practices in order to improve them. Previous studies (e.g., Gobert & 
Punch, 2003; Avakian & Roberts, 2012; Johnson & Kraft, 1990; Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 
1989) described whistleblowers as people who prefer reform, actively bringing significant 
changes to the organization by challenging the established order. Such people are to be 
distinguished from dissenters who disagree with the inappropriate practices of the 
organization but do nothing to combat them (Near & Miceli, 1987). Therefore, we 
hypothesized:  
 
H3: Whistleblowers’ preference for reform will significantly contribute to the intention to 




We collected data from a survey asking external whistleblowers in South Korea to 
complete a questionnaire. The survey was conducted in three phases. First, we compiled the 
list of whistleblowers who had disclosed wrongdoing since 1990 and whose identities had 
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become known to the public, locating as many of them as possible by using the electronic 
databases of three major daily newspapers (Dong-A Daily News, JoongAng Ilbo, and 
Hankyoreh). Second, we managed to obtain the whistleblowers' contact details from non -
governmental organizations (NGOs) that had provided various forms of support to them, their 
former colleagues, and friends who might know their whereabouts. Third, we asked the 
whistleblowers we were able to contact to participate in the survey via e-mail. For some not 
reached by e-mail, we visited their locations. Ensuring the respondents' voluntary 
participation and the confidentiality of their personal information, we conducted the survey 
between December 2013 and January 2017. In total we contacted 143 whistleblowers and 127 
completed questionnaires were received. Thus the response rate was 89 percent. We 
considered the sample to be large enough for the purpose of this study because very few 
whistleblowers were reported by the media. 
 
Measures  
The survey questionnaire used to measure variables consisted of two parts: one part 
assessed motivations, the intention to blow the whistle again, the perception of negative 
consequences of whistleblowing, and preference for reform; the other part asked for 
participants’ demographic information. Three motivations for the decision to blow the whistle 
(morality, cost-benefit, and emotion), which do not always make contextual sense, are 
underlying constructs that could be better measured by not a single indicator, but multiple 
indicators. To measure the importance of motivations, we identified nine elements of three 
motivations, morality, cost-benefit analysis and emotion, from the literature review and 
conceptual definitions (three items for each of the three motivations). The questionnaire 
asked the participants “How much did you consider (or how significant were) the following 
items when you made the decision to blow the whistle?” The participants rated each of the 
 11 
items from their personal experience, using a five-point Likert scale, from 1 = ‘do not agree 
at all’ to 5 = `completely agree.’ We performed a factor analysis which is a statistical method 
used to cluster observed variables into homogeneous sets to examine whether the items of 
fundamental thoughts or ideas behind the decisions to blow the whistle are significantly 
grouped as morality, cost-benefit, and emotion, respectively. Before confirming the 
dimensionality of motivations, we first conducted KMO and Bartlett's test to check whether 
the sample of 127 was appropriate for factor analysis. The KMO evaluation of the sampling 
adequacy was .639 (approx. Chi-square = 283.151, df = 36, sig = .000), indicating that the 
sample was adequate for the purpose of this study because a value greater than .5 is 
considered acceptable (see Kaiser, 1974). We ran an exploratory factor analysis of the items 
to determine the proper number of factors to retain for further analysis, using both Kaiser’s 
rule (the eigenvalues of all components from the principal component analysis > 1) and 
parallel analysis’ rule (the eigenvalues from parallel analysis > those from principal 
component analysis) recommended by previous studies (e.g., Franklin et al., 1995), to 
prevent extracting more factors than necessary. Table 2 shows the eigenvalues and final 
rotated factor matrix for the nine items of motivation. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE  
 
A factor analysis yielded three factors, explaining 65.359% of the total variance: the third 
eigenvalue produced by principal component analysis was greater than the corresponding 
eigenvalue (1.246) from the parallel analysis. The three factors were cost-benefit analysis, 
morality, and emotion. Cronbach's alpha of the three as scale reliability was .729, .657, 
and .674, respectively. We used the means of their respective items as a value of each of cost-
benefit analysis, morality, and emotion. 
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The intention to blow the whistle again was measured by the extent to which respondents 
would raise concerns again if they faced a similar situation. There are two main ways to 
measure such an intention in a survey: one is to assess the extent to which respondents would 
raise concerns again if in the same situation as they were in for their first whistleblowing; the 
other is to ask about the propensity to blow the whistle using a scenario in which 
whistleblowing might be required. Previous studies (e.g., Jos, Tompkins, & Hays, 1989; 
Jackson et al., 2010; Soeken & Soeken, 1987) that assessed the intention to blow the whistle 
again asked whistleblowers whether they would raise concerns again even if they had known 
the negative consequences that they suffered after reporting wrongdoing. These questions 
measured whistleblowers’ confidence that their prior decision to raise concerns was right and 
that they did not regret it from their own experience. The answer to the latter question would 
also in part reflect their subjective evaluation of how satisfied they were with the 
whistleblower protection system as a whole. Based on this understanding, we developed two 
statements to measure the intention to blow the whistle again: “If I am in the same situation, I 
will report wrongdoing again” and “I do not regret what I did.” We carried out a factor 
analysis in the same way as outlined above, extracting a single factor (Cronbach's α = .729). 
As for the perceived negative consequences that resulted from blowing the whistle, we 
measured it by asking respondents to rate a statement “I was badly harmed by disclosing 
wrongdoing within my organization.” We used four statements to measure the preference for 
reform as another independent variable of the intention to blow the whistle again: (1) “When 
performing tasks in my job, I regard work values (e.g., principles and ideals) to be the most 
important”; (2) “I am a reform-oriented person”; (3) “I think continuous changes are 
unavoidable”; and (4) “For further development, a reform that actively identifies a problem 
and fixes it is important.” The respondents rated each of the statements using a 5-point Likert 
scale as above. A factor analysis produced a single factor, explaining about 63.923% of the 
 13 
variance in the items. Cronbach's alpha for preference for reform was .756. and we used the 
mean of the four items as a value for this preference. 
Demographic variables were measured by asking participants about their sex, age, and 
education level. The participants consisted of 109 (85.8%) males and 18 (14.2%) females. 
Age was recorded in five categories: 1 = under 30, 2 = 30–39, 3 = 40–49, 4 = 50–59, and 5 = 
over 59. The responses were 7 (5.5%), 7 (5.5%), 57 (44.9%), 46 (36.2%), and 10 (7.9%), 
respectively, showing that most of the sample consisted of males in their 40s and 50s. The 
participants' education levels were as follows: only 7 respondents (5.5%) had less than a 
high-school diploma or equivalent, 69 (54.3%) had a junior college/four-year university 




Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of each of the important variables 
measured in the survey, as well as their bivariate correlations. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The mean of the intention to blow the whistle again was 3.89, showing that most 
whistleblowers would raise concerns again if they faced the same situation. The mean of 
morality was 4.42, the highest of the three motivations, while the mean of cost-benefit 
analysis was the lowest at 2.78 (a bit less than ‘somewhat agree’). This result suggests that 
the decision to blow the whistle was based on a mix in varying degrees of morality, emotion, 
and cost-benefit analysis. Morality was the most strongly and positively related to preference 
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for reform (r = .499, p < .001). The intention to blow the whistle again was positively related 
to morality and to preference for reform (r = .377, p < .001; r = .296, p < .001, respectively), 
while the relationships between the intention and cost-benefit analysis or emotion were not 
significant. Morality and the perceived negative consequences were positively correlated at 
the .05 level of significance (r = .179, p < .05). Education level had a positive relationship 
with morality and preference for reform (r = .210, p < .05; r = .181, p < .05, respectively), but 
a negative relationship with cost-benefit analysis and emotion (r = -.178, p < .05; r = -.244, p 
< .01, respectively). Thus the more educated the respondents were, the more they considered 
morality important and preferred reform, but the less important they considered cost-benefit 
analysis and emotion as motivations for blowing the whistle. 
 
Testing the Relative Importance of the Motivations 
One of the major questions of this study was how important external whistleblowers 
consider morality, cost-benefit analysis, and emotion in the decision to disclose wrongdoing, 
and further, which is most important of the three. Using a t-test, we compared the means of 
the three motivations. Table 4 presents the results.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Morality was the most important motivation for external whistleblowing, while cost-
benefit was the least. The mean of morality (m = 4.42, sd = .65) was significantly greater than 
that of emotion (m = 3.13, sd = 1.01; mean differences = 1.29, t = 12.153, p < .001). The 
mean of emotion was also greater than that of cost-benefit (mean differences = .35. t = 3.193, 
p < .002). Based on these results, Hypothesis 1 (Out of the motivations, morality will be the 
most important one in deciding to blow the whistle) was accepted.  
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Effect of Independent Variables on the Intention to Blow the Whistle Again 
Another major question in this study was to what extent the three motivations and other 
factors, such as the perceived negative consequences of whistleblowing and the preference 
for reform accounted for the intention to blow the whistle again. To examine their effect we 
performed a regression analysis controlling demographic variables because education level 
was significantly associated with some of the important independent variables in the above 
correlation analysis. We checked whether the sample of 127 external whistleblowers was 
large enough for a significant fit of the regression model, and found that the sample size was 
appropriate for the analysis. According to the a-priori sample size calculator for multiple 
regression, the minimum required sample size for the regression model with eight predictors, 
using an alpha level of .05, a statistical power of .80, and anticipated effect size of .15, is 108 
(see http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/calculator.aspx?id=1). Table 5 details the results.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The regression model of the intention to blow the whistle again was significant (Adj. R 
square = .157, F = 5.694, p < .001). The effects of morality and the perceived negative 
consequences of whistleblowing were significant (b = .607, p < .001; b = -.207, p < .05, 
respectively), showing that morality significantly increases the intent to blow the whistle 
again, whereas the perceived negative consequences reduce this intention. Emotion and cost-
benefit analysis appeared not to significantly influence the intention. These results fully 
supported the hypotheses H2a (Morality will significantly contribute to increasing the 
intention to blow the whistle again), and hypothesis H2b (Cost-benefit calculations and 
emotion will not have a significant effect on the intention to do so again). Hypothesis H2c 
(The perceived negative consequences as a result of blowing the whistle will reduce the 
intention to do so again) was also accepted, showing that the more negative consequences 
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whistleblowers perceive that they suffered after disclosing wrongdoing, the more they would 
not raise concerns again if they faced the same situation. The effect of the preference for 
reform was not significant (b=.291, p > .05) when the motivations were included in a 
regression analysis as a predictor of the intention although the preference for reform was 
significantly related with the intention in the above correlation analysis. Based on this result, 
Hypothesis H3 was not accepted. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 
We believe that this study provides some interesting findings, particularly as they reflect 
the views of actual whistleblowers rather than respondents to a hypothetical scenario. First, 
morality was the most important driver in external whistleblowers’ view behind their decision 
to blow the whistle, followed by emotion and cost-benefit calculations. Whistleblowing was 
triggered not by a single motivation but by a mix of multiple motivations, i.e. morality, 
emotion, and cost-benefit analysis. This is in line with previous studies (e.g., Contu, 2014) 
that the motives for whistleblowing may be mixed. Second, the perceived negative 
consequences as a result of blowing the whistle were a significant factor in reducing the 
intent to blow the whistle again. Third, although external whistleblowers perceived 
themselves as highly reform-oriented, the preference for reform did not have a significant 
effect on the intention to blow the whistle again. These findings have several theoretical and 
practical implications, and some of them are somewhat different from the assumptions or 
views adopted in previous studies. 
Of the three motivations, external whistleblowers considered morality (as assessed by the 
belief in moral values) the most important in their decision to disclose wrongdoing, 
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confirming the assertion of previous studies that the whistle is mostly blown for a moral 
motive. Avakian and Roberts (2012: 71) explained that morality is an important value that 
inspires workers to have courage to blow the whistle and “persistence against the harshness 
experienced as a result of their actions.” Our results provide further evidence to support the 
claim that morality is a critical motivator for whistleblowing. They also have implications for 
the debate about how to encourage people to raise concerns about wrongdoing. If workers are 
driven by moral values it would make sense to offer awards and positive recognition to 
whistleblowers and to introduce ethical training programmes which underline the value to 
both employers and society generally of a willingness to raise concerns 
Emotion was the second most important motivation for external whistleblowing. This 
result provides some supporting evidence for the findings of previous studies (e.g., Hollings, 
2013; Henik, 2008) that the decision to raise concerns is motivated by emotion, particularly 
anger. Indeed, it is hard to understand how the decision to blow the whistle could be made 
without considering the role of emotions as a primary factor. Liyanarachchi and Adler (2011: 
176) stated that an organizational “retaliation invokes emotions, especially anger,” and “when 
anger is invoked, (people) tend to do things even if their actions cost them something” (as 
cited in Ariely 2009: 83). We regard the internal reporting of concerns about wrongdoing as 
desirable for employers, workers and society. Nevertheless, when emotion has a significant 
role as a motivation for external whistleblowing, a psychological approach such as 
counseling would seem to be valuable in helping an organization manage the potential risks 
of external disclosures. Ugazio, Lamm, and Singer (2012) maintained that the roles of 
emotion for moral responses can vary depending on the type of emotion. For example, 
Weiner (1986) divided emotion into two types in the attribution theory, according to whether 
or not emotion is generated by a specific cause: attribution independent and dependent 
emotions. When a behavioral response is guided by an emotional feeling about whether an 
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event or behavior is good or bad, anger is regarded as an emotion, not just in general but in 
particular, most commonly representing attribution dependent emotion that occurs by 
assessing whether the cause is acceptable. Choi and Lin (2009) found in their study on the 
role of emotion in crisis that responsibility and behavioral response to a crisis were 
significantly associated with attribution-dependent emotion (anger, disgust, contempt, 
surprise, fear, and distress), but not with attribution-independent emotion (alert and 
confusion). Given that the role of emotions in workers moral perceptions and responses has 
still not been fully examined (Brown & Mitchell, 2010), it might be worthwhile to further 
explore the roles of these two types of emotions because they may differ from each other in 
the decision to blow the whistle.  
Cost-benefit calculation was the least important in the decision-making process to blow the 
whistle externally, although many whistleblowing studies (e.g., Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; 
Miceli et al., 2012; Keil et al., 2010; Delk, 2013) have assumed that the weighing of costs 
and benefits is a major factor. Our respondents perceived that costs and benefits were 
relatively less important than morality and emotion. This result suggests that improving 
monetary incentives would not be much help in encouraging employees to report wrongdoing 
externally. This finding does not reject or discount the importance of cost-benefit calculations 
as a motivation in internal whistleblowing or for the intention to blow the whistle. Cost-
benefit analysis could be rather a more important motivator for internal whistleblowing and 
the intention to blow the whistle than for external whistleblowing and whistleblowing as an 
actual behavior, because a cost-benefit analysis can be applied more accurately in a situation 
that is stable and in which it is possible to predict results with certainty. For example, Miceli 
et al. (2009) maintained that monetary payouts to whistleblowers could increase internal 
whistleblowing in terms of its intention and its frequencies. Brink, Lowe, and Victoravich 
(2013) found that monetary rewards for internal whistleblowing increase the intention to use 
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internal channels to report wrongdoing as they replace the role of morality as an intrinsic 
motivator in the decision whether or not to blow the whistle. Keil et al. (2010) also reported 
that ‘benefit-to-cost differential’ creates the intention to blow the whistle. These studies show 
that the importance of cost-benefit analysis as a motivation may differ depending on whether 
whistleblowing is internal or external and on whether the whistle is actually blown or there is 
simply an intention to do so. 
As for the intention to blow the whistle again, our findings are consistent with previous 
studies (Greaves & McGlone, 2012; Peeples, Stokes, & Wingfield, 2009; Jos, Tompkins, & 
Hays, 1989) in identifying morality and the perceived negative consequences as the 
significant factors. The results indicate that whistleblowers who were motivated by a high 
moral obligation would blow the whistle again, having no regrets about their behavior, and 
whistleblowers who were seriously damaged because of blowing the whistle would never 
raise concerns again. Cost-benefit analysis and emotion as motivations had no significant 
association with the intent to blow the whistle again. A preference for reform was not 
significant in increasing the intention to blow the whistle again either, although external 
whistleblowers identified themselves as highly committed to change the status quo. The 
overall results suggest that more moral rewards to, and better protection against retaliation of, 
employees who report wrongdoing would help increase the intent to blow the whistle again. 
It almost goes without saying that this is an area where management can have a big impact. 
For example, willingness to raise concerns can be taken into account in appraisal and 
promotion exercises and the value of reporting can be acknowledged by open discussion and 





This study examined some assumptions or views about the motivations of actual external 
whistleblowers and the effect of those motivations and other factors on the intent to blow the 
whistle again. The results revealed that, while the whistle is blown as a result of a mix of 
motivations, morality is the most important and cost-benefit analysis is the least. Morality 
alone out of the three motivations and the perceived negative consequences of 
whistleblowing are the significant factors that influence the intent to blow the whistle again. 
These findings have clear implications for both employers and policy–makers. If 
whistleblowing is to be encouraged in the public interest, people need to be educated about 
the value of speaking up about wrongdoing as well as the procedure for raising concerns. In 
particular, ethics training may well be in the interests of employers if they wish to promote 
internal reporting before or instead of external disclosures of alleged wrongdoing. As regards 
the perceived negative consequences of whistleblowing, employers need to provide both 
written assurances about non-retaliation and ensure that reprisals do not occur in practice. 
The lesson for law-makers is that compensation for those who experience a detriment as a 
result of whistleblowing may be insufficient to encourage potential whistleblowers. Thus 
legislators should also attempt to deter retaliation by making it a serious criminal offence and 
making injunctions readily available both to whistleblowers and anyone associated with them 




This study has some limitations, the first being that its data were collected from Korean 
external whistleblowers. Previous studies have stated that intention of and attitudes toward 
whistleblowing may be influenced by cultural orientation or “traits such as Confucian ethics 
and collectivism” (Park et al., 2008: 936; Park, Rehg, & Lee, 2005). The results of this study 
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results might not apply to external whistleblowers in other cultures. Higher morality of 
respondents in this study might be partly attributed to Asian culture. A second limitation 
concerns the fact that the findings were based on a self-report survey. Contu (2014) claimed 
that it is hard to ascertain the ‘pure’ or real motive of whistleblowing by surveys or 
interviews with whistleblowers because the knowledge about the motive gained from 
whistleblowers is vulnerable to self-interested or socially desirable bias. Part of the data used 
in this study were collected by visiting respondents even though they were a very few cases. 
The respondents might answer questions in a more socially acceptable manner. Since 
whistleblowers can be the only source of such information, researchers need to find other 
methods to overcome these limitations. Follow-up studies are also recommended to ascertain 
how the findings in this study differ for internal whistleblowing and the intent to internally 
blow the whistle again. Previous studies have found that types of wrongdoing (Near et al., 
2004; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991) and its perceived severity (King, 1997; Miceli & Near, 
1994; Near & Miceli, 1986) are significant factors to influence whistleblowing intention. The 
intent to blow the whistle again may vary depending on how well a statutory framework for 
whistleblowing is prepared to protect whistleblowers. Future studies are warranted to further 
investigate the impact of these factors on the intent. 
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Results of Factor Analysis on the Items of Motivation for Blowing the 










1 Economic gains and losses .837 -.094 .132 
2 Rationality, calculations, cool-
headedness  
.715 .252 -.084 
3 True or false .222 .765 -.007 
4 Cost-benefit .810 -.153 .201 
5 Misery, anxiety, distress .382 .057 .729 
6 Anger, insult, unpleasantness .070 .180 .844 
7 Right or wrong -.018 .861 .030 
8 Honour, courage -.182 .664 -.024 
9 Emotion -.080 -.230 .716 
Eigenvalues 2.483 1.958 1.441 
Cumulative % 27.589 49.346 65.359 
Reliability (Cronbach's α) .729 .657 .674 
Table 1 
Types of Motivations for Blowing the Whistle 
Motivations Key Elements 
Morality True or false, right or wrong, honor, courage 
Cost-benefit 
Rationality, calculations, cool-headedness, economic gains and 
losses 
Emotion 
Anger, resentment, insult, unpleasantness, misery, anxiety, 
distress 
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Note: Factor loadings > .55 are in boldface. In a sample of 100, a factor loading 
value of about .55 and above is required for significance (Hair et al., 2010: 117). 
We used a factor loading value of .50 and above as having practical significance 





















GN AG ED 
Intention to 
Blow the whistle 
again  
3.89 1.21 1.00         
Morality 4.42 .65 .377*** 1.00        
Cost-benefit 2.78 1.03 .044 .024 1.00       
Emotion 3.13 1.01 -.039 .013 .270** 1.00      
Negative  
consequences 
4.37 .98 -.093 .179* -.072 .020 1.00     
Preference for 
Reform 
4.29 .67 .296*** .499*** -.054 .042 .130 1.00    
Gender .86 .35 .000 -.063 .156 -.030 -.006 -.014 1.00   
Age 3.35 .91 .127 .159 .106 -.079 .092 .167 .350*** 1.00  
Education 2.35 .58 -.054 .210* -.178* -.244** .079 .181* .078 .170 1.00 
Note: Correlations with GN are Spearman’s rho. The report of gender was coded as 1 = male, 0 = 
female; age as 1 = under 30, 2 = 30–39, 3 = 40–49, 4 = 50–59, 5 = over 59; levels of education as 1 = 
less than a high school diploma or equivalent, 2 = junior college degree/four-year university degree, 3 = 
postgraduate degree. 








Results of T-Test of the Motivations (N = 127) 
Motivational  
bases 
Mortality vs Emotion Emotion vs Cost-benefit 
Morality Emotion Emotion Cost-benefit 
Mean (SD) 4.42 (.65) 3.13 (1.01) 3.13 (1.01) 2.78 (1.03) 
Mean differences 1.29 .35 
t-value 12.153*** 3.193** 




Effects of the Predictors on the Intent to Re-blow 
the Whistle (N = 127) 
Predictors 
Dependent Variable:  
Intention to Blow the 
Whistle again 
B Beta t 
Morality .607 .327 3.422*** 
Cost-benefit .058 .049 .570 
Emotion -.072 -.060 -.704 
Negative  
consequences 
-.207 -.168 -2.007* 
Preference for Reform .291 .160 1.683 
Constant .933  1.033 
Adj. R square .157 
F value 5.694 
Significance .000 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; two-tailed tests. 
 
